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  This Essay examines how law can help to control financial chaos. 
To that end, regulation should strive to not only maximize economic 
efficiency within the financial system but also protect the financial system 
itself. Any regulatory framework for achieving these goals, however, will 
be imperfect and have tradeoffs. Increasing financial complexity has created 
information failures that even disclosure cannot remedy, whereas law-
imposed standardization would have its own flaws. Bounded human 
rationality limits the effectiveness of even otherwise ideal laws. 
Furthermore, the increasing dispersion of financial risk is undermining 
monitoring incentives. We also do not yet fully understand how systemic 
risk is triggered and spread. Because regulation therefore cannot prevent 
systemic shocks, regulation should also operate to reduce systemic 
consequences by stabilizing parts of the financial system afflicted by those 
shocks.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 How can the law help to control financial chaos? By financial 
chaos, I mean the failure of a chain of financial markets or financial 
firms, or a chain of significant losses to financial firms, that results in 
increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability.1 The risk 
that financial chaos will occur is often referred to as systemic risk.2 
Many regulatory responses to systemic risk, like the Dodd-Frank 
Act in the United States, consist largely of politically motivated 
reactions to the 2008 financial crisis,3 looking for villains (whether or 
not they exist).4 To be most effective, however, the regulation must be 
situated within a more analytical framework.  
To create such a framework, we first need to consider what the 
scope of systemic risk regulation should be. There has been a great deal 
of regulatory focus on banks and other financial firms. Some of this is 
path dependent: historically, a chain of bank failures remains an 
important symbol of systemic risk. The media and politicians also have 
focused on financial firms because they are so visible and their 
problems have been so dramatic. 
But we also need to recognize that the ongoing trend towards 
disintermediation—enabling companies to directly access the ultimate 
source of funds, the capital markets, without going through financial 
 
 1. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008) 
(defining systemic risk in these terms). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Another dimension of this problem is that politicians have short-term 
reelection goals whereas good regulatory solutions are often long-term. Cf. Edward J. 
Kane, The Inevitability of Shadowy Banking 12 (Mar. 6, 2012) (draft on file with 
author) (“Because regulators have relatively short terms in office, they are attracted to 
temporary, rather than lasting[,] fixes.”). 
 4. The Dodd-Frank Act delegates much of the regulatory details to 
administrative rulemaking, in many cases after the relevant government agencies 
engage in further study. Perhaps even more significantly, the Act creates a Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, part of whose mission is to monitor and identify potential 
systemic threats in order to find regulatory gaps. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 112, 124 Stat. 1376, 1394–98 
(2010). The Council will be aided in this task by a newly created and, hopefully, 
nonpartisan Office of Financial Research. Id. Regulators therefore will have the ability 
to look beyond the Act’s confines. 
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intermediaries—is making financial markets themselves increasingly 
central to any examination of systemic risk.5  
For example, although the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 
filled the headlines, its trigger was the collapse of the market for 
mortgage-backed securities. Many of these securities were 
collateralized in part by risky subprime home mortgages, which were 
expected to be refinanced through home appreciation. When home 
prices stopped appreciating, the borrowers could not refinance. In many 
cases, they defaulted. These defaults caused substantial amounts of 
investment-grade-rated mortgage-backed securities to be downgraded 
and, in some cases, to default. Investors began losing confidence in 
these and other rated securities, and their market prices started falling.  
Lehman Brothers, which held large amounts of mortgage-backed 
securities, was particularly exposed. Lehman’s counterparties began 
demanding additional safeguards, which Lehman could not provide. 
Absent a government bailout, Lehman filed for bankruptcy. That, in 
turn, caused securities markets to panic; even the short-term 
commercial paper market virtually shut down, and the market prices of 
mortgage-backed securities collapsed substantially below the intrinsic 
value of the mortgage loans backing those securities.6 That accelerated 
the death spiral, causing financial firms holding mortgage-backed 
securities to appear, if not be, more financially risky; requiring highly 
leveraged firms to engage in fire-sales of assets (thereby exacerbating 
the fall in prices); and shutting off credit markets, which impacted the 
real economy. 
This demonstrates that both financial firms and financial markets 
can, if they fail, be triggers and transmitters of systemic risk. The 
scope of any regulatory framework for managing systemic risk should 
therefore include both financial firms and markets. 
Before attempting to design such a regulatory framework, we need 
to examine what the framework’s goals should be. The primary goal for 
regulating financial risk is micro-prudential: maximizing economic 
efficiency within the financial system. Systemic risk is a form of 
financial risk, so efficiency should certainly be a goal in its regulation. 
But systemic risk also represents risk to the financial system itself. Any 
 
 5. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 200. 
 6. Even prior to Lehman’s collapse, mortgage-backed securities may have 
been undervalued in the market. For example, in July 2008 I was an expert in the Orion 
Finance SIV case in the English High Court of Justice. Orion’s mortgage-backed 
securities had a market value of around twenty-two cents on the dollar, whereas the 
present value of its reasonably expected cash flows was around eighty-eight cents on the 
dollar because most of the mortgages were prime. 
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framework for regulating systemic risk therefore should also include 
that macro-prudential goal: protecting the financial system itself.7 
I. MAXIMIZING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY WITHIN THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM 
Financial regulation can help to maximize economic efficiency by 
correcting market failures. As discussed below, at least four types of 
partly interrelated market failures occur within the financial system: 
information failure, rationality failure, principal-agent failure, and 
incentive failure.  
A. Correcting Information Failure 
Complexity is the main cause of financial information failure.8 
Financial markets and products are already incredibly complex, and 
that complexity is certain to increase. Profit opportunities are inherent 
in complexity, due in part to investor demand for securities that more 
precisely match their risk and reward preferences. Regulatory arbitrage 
increases complexity as market participants take advantage of 
inconsistent regulatory regimes both within and across national borders. 
And new technologies continue to add complexity not only to financial 
products but also to financial markets.9 
Complexity has been undermining disclosure, which has been the 
chief regulatory response to financial information failure.10 Although 
most, if not all, of the risks on complex mortgage-backed securities 
were disclosed prior to the 2008 financial crisis, many institutional 
 
 7. For a critical discussion of the rationale of financial regulation, see 
EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE LAW, THE 
ECONOMICS, THE POLITICS (forthcoming 2012). 
 8. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial 
Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211 (2009). Information failure can arise from other 
causes as well, including the potential for transaction costs relating to information 
acquisition to diminish the value of new information (and thus the incentive to acquire 
such information). See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility 
of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980). 
 9. I have argued that there are two aspects to complexity: cognitive 
complexity, meaning that things are too complicated and non-linear to understand; and 
temporal complexity, meaning that systems work too quickly and interactively to 
control. Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 214–15. Engineers sometimes refer to temporal 
complexity as tight coupling. Id.  
 10. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission 
and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1209–35 (1999) 
(discussing the general purpose of disclosure in the Exchange Act and the Securities 
Act). 
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investors—including even the largest, most sophisticated firms—bought 
these securities without fully understanding them.11 
The Dodd-Frank Act puts great stock in the idea of improving 
disclosure,12 but its efficacy will be limited. Some financial structures 
are getting so complex that they are incomprehensible.13 Furthermore, 
it may well be rational for an investor to invest in high-yielding 
complex securities without fully understanding them. Among other 
reasons,14 the investor simply may not have the staffing to evaluate the 
securities, whereas failure to invest would appear to—and in fact 
could—competitively prejudice the investor vis-à-vis others who invest.  
This begs the question whether institutional investors will hire 
experts as needed to decipher complex deals. The evidence suggests 
they do not always do so, and theory explains why. Although experts 
may be hired to the extent that their costs do not exceed the benefits 
gained from more fully understanding the complexity, at some level of 
complexity those costs will exceed—or at least appear to exceed—any 
potential gain. This is because the cost of hiring experts is tangible, 
whereas the benefit gained from fully understanding complex 
transactions is intangible and harder to quantify—especially since 
constantly innovating markets cause rapid informational obsolescence. 
Managers attempting a cost-benefit analysis may well give greater 
weight to the tangible cost and less credence to any intangible benefit. 
 
 11. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1110; cf. John D. Finnerty & Kishlaya Pathak, A 
Review of Recent Derivatives Litigation, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 73, 74 
(2011) (observing that court records reveal investors’ misunderstandings about the 
nature of derivative financial instruments). 
 12. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1103, 124 Stat. 1376, 2118–20 (2010) (requiring additional 
disclosure); § 942(b) (requiring issuers of asset-backed securities to disclose 
information on the assets backing each tranche of security); § 945 (requiring the SEC to 
issue rules requiring issuers of asset-backed securities to disclose the nature of the 
underlying assets); § 951 (requiring persons who make solicitations for the sale of all or 
substantially all of a corporation’s assets to disclose their compensation arrangements to 
shareholders). 
 13. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit, Did We Make Things Too Complicated?, 
INT’L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 2008, at 24; David Barboza, Complex El Paso Partnerships 
Puzzle Analysts, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at C1 (“[O]ne industry giant, the El Paso 
Corporation, is growing ever more reliant on deals [using off-balance sheet 
partnerships] so complex that securities experts call them incomprehensible.”). It 
appears hyperbolic to say that structures created by humans cannot be understood by 
humans. The larger problem may be that relatively few people can understand the 
structures and that many structures may not be able to be understood by any single 
person. 
 14. For a comprehensive review of these reasons, see Schwarcz, supra note 
11, at 1113–15.  
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“The more complex the transaction, the higher the costs, and thus the 
more likely it is that the cost-benefit balance will be out of 
equilibrium.”15  
Information failure not only undermines investor disclosure. It also 
undermines the ability of regulators themselves to keep up with the 
financial industry, and indeed regulators have extreme difficulty 
keeping up with financial innovation.16  
A possible way to address information failure resulting from 
complexity would be to require investments and other financial 
products to become more standardized. One of the goals of the Dodd-
Frank Act, for example, is to standardize more derivatives transactions. 
To this end, the Act requires many derivatives to be cleared through 
clearinghouses,17 which generally require a high degree of 
standardization in the derivatives they clear.18  
But standardization can backfire. Dodd-Frank’s clearinghouse 
requirement might inadvertently increase systemic risk by concentrating 
derivatives exposure at the clearinghouse level.19 And the overall 
economic impact of standardization is unclear because standardization 
can stifle innovation and interfere with the ability of parties to achieve 
the efficiencies that arise when firms craft financial products tailored to 
the particular needs and risk preferences of investors. 
Dodd-Frank also attempts to address information failure by 
requiring sellers of securitization products to retain a minimum 
unhedged position in each class of securities they sell—the so-called 
“skin in the game.”20 This too can backfire. By retaining residual risk 
portions of certain complex securitization products they were selling, 
underwriters may actually have fostered false investor confidence, 
contributing to the 2008 financial crisis. Complexity, in other words, 
 
 15. Id. at 1114. 
 16. See, e.g., Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of 
Modern Financial Markets 37–51 (Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 49/2011, 
2011), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1916649 (discussing the relationship 
between complexity and financial innovation in the regulation of OTC derivatives). 
 17. Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a). 
 18. This can become a little circular, though, because Dodd-Frank includes an 
exception for derivatives that a clearinghouse will not accept for clearing. § 723(a)(3).  
 19. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: 
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1395 (2011) 
(“Central clearing merely shifts counterparty risk to a clearinghouse, reducing that risk 
only to the extent that clearinghouses can manage risk better or are more creditworthy 
than individual firms.”). 
 20. See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 941(b), § 15G (directing the SEC to require 
sponsors of asset-backed securities to retain at least five percent of the credit risk of the 
underlying assets). 
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can cause not only information asymmetry but also mutual 
misinformation.21  
In a world of complexity, disclosure will not always be sufficient 
to correct information failure. Moreover, even perfect disclosure would 
be insufficient to mitigate information failures that cause systemic risk. 
Individual market participants who fully understand the risk will be 
motivated to protect themselves but not necessarily the financial system 
as a whole. A market participant may well decide to engage in a 
profitable transaction even though doing so could increase systemic 
risk, since much of the harm from a possible systemic collapse would 
be externalized onto other market participants as well as onto ordinary 
citizens impacted by an economic collapse.22 
There are, therefore, no complete solutions to the problem of 
financial information failure.  
 
B. Correcting Rationality Failure  
 
Even in financial markets, humans have bounded rationality—a 
type of information failure, but one distinct and important enough to 
merit a separate category. Investors are complacent, following the herd 
in their investment choices and over-relying on heuristics, such as 
rating-agency ratings.23 Market participants are also prone to panic.24 
Furthermore, due to optimism bias and availability bias, they are 
unrealistically optimistic when thinking about extreme events with 
 
 21. See Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 241–42 (discussing mutual 
misinformation). 
 22. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 206 (explaining this concept and describing 
it as a type of “tragedy of the commons”). It is a tragedy of the commons insofar as 
market participants suffer from the actions of other market participants; it is a more 
standard externality insofar as non-market participants suffer from the actions of market 
participants. 
 23. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the 
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 379–83, 404–05 (2008). 
 24. For a thoughtful analysis of how rationality failures help to explain the 
2008 financial crisis, see Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: 
How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807 (2010). One of the causes of the financial crisis may 
have been intellectual hazard, “the tendency of behavioral biases to interfere with 
accurate thought and analysis within complex organizations.” Id. at 808. Some 
examples of behavioral biases include complexity bias, the tendency to analyze a 
situation wrongly because of inadequate ability to interpret complex information; 
incentive bias, the tendency “to see the world in accordance with their [own] self-
interest”; and asymmetry bias, the tendency to rely on “pre-formed and fixed ideas, 
judgments, or attitudes.” Id. at 813–18. During the financial crisis, actors in complex 
organizations enabled the spread of systemic risk by failing to properly acquire, 
process, transmit, and implement key risk-related information. Id. at 810. 
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which they have no recent experience, devaluing the likelihood and 
potential consequences of those events.25 
Thus, during periods of relative economic stability—such as during 
the decade before the financial crisis—market participants may under-
assess the risk of low-probability adverse market events. They may also 
underestimate seemingly mundane low-probability events. For example, 
their very familiarity with collateral may have led members of the 
financial community to underestimate the likelihood and potential 
consequences of a drop in housing prices. The impact of that drop on 
collateral value changed, in some cases, what was thought to be 
overcollateralized (and therefore protected) mortgage-backed securities 
into under-secured (and therefore insufficiently protected) securities.26  
Dodd-Frank attempts to fix a sliver of this problem by attempting 
to improve rating-agency ratings.27 But the greater regulatory hurdle is 
that human nature cannot be easily changed. It is unclear—and Dodd-
Frank does not address—how complacency, for example, can be 
remedied. And although panics are often the triggers that commence a 
chain of systemic failures, it is impossible to identify all the causes of 
panics that can trigger systemic risk.  
C. Correcting Principal-Agent Failure 
Scholars have long studied inefficiencies resulting from conflicts of 
interest between managers and owners of firms. The Dodd-Frank Act 
attempts to fix this traditional type of conflict. It ignores, however, a 
much more insidious principal-agent failure: the intra-firm problem of 
secondary-management conflicts.28 The nub of the problem is that 
secondary managers are almost always paid under short-term 
compensation schemes, misaligning their interests with the long-term 
interests of the firm.29  
Complexity exacerbates this problem by increasing information 
asymmetry between technically sophisticated secondary managers and 
the senior managers to whom they report. For example, as the VaR, or 
value-at-risk, model for measuring investment-portfolio risk became 
more accepted, financial firms began compensating secondary managers 
not only for generating profits but also for generating profits with low 
 
 25. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 1366–67. 
 26. Id. at 1367–68. 
 27. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, secs. 931–939H, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872–90 (2010). 
 28. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem 
of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 (2009). 
 29. Id. at 460.  
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risks, as measured by VaR.30 Secondary managers turned to investment 
products with low VaR risk profile, like credit-defaults swaps that 
generate small gains but only rarely have losses. They knew, but did 
not always explain to their superiors, that any losses that might 
eventually occur would be huge.  
In theory, firms can solve this principal-agent failure by paying 
managers, including secondary managers, under longer-term 
compensation schemes (e.g., compensation subject to clawbacks or 
deferred compensation based on long-term results).31 In practice, 
however, that solution would confront a collective action problem: 
firms that offer their secondary managers longer-term compensation 
might not be able to hire as competitively as firms that offer more 
immediate compensation.32 Regulation may be needed to help solve this 
collective action problem not only within nations but also across 
nations,33 because good secondary managers can work in financial 
centers worldwide.  
D. Correcting Incentive Failure 
Risk dispersion can create benefits, such as investment 
diversification and more efficient allocation of risk. But risk can be 
marginalized, becoming “so widely dispersed that rational market 
participants individually lack the incentive to monitor it.”34 This 
 
 30. See, e.g., PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR 
MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 568 (3d ed. 2007). 
 31. It appears that at least two financial firms, Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley, are beginning to implement this type of compensation policy. See Liz Moyer, 
On ‘Bleak’ Street, Bosses in Cross Hairs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2012, at C1 (reporting 
that these firms “would seek to recover pay from any employee whose actions expose 
the firms to substantial financial or legal repercussions”). 
 32. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 127, 157–58 (2009) (arguing that financial firms have had trouble balancing the 
discouragement of excessive risk-taking against the need to create profit-maximizing 
incentives and preferences). 
 33. The Basel Capital Accords exemplify global rules intended to help avoid 
prejudicing the competitiveness of firms—in this case, banks—in any given nation or 
region. See, e.g., Clyde Stoltenberg et al., The Past Decade of Regulatory Change in 
the U.S. and EU Capital Market Regimes: An Evolution from National Interests toward 
International Harmonization with Emerging G-20 Leadership, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
577, 615–44 (2011) (examining U.S. and E.U. efforts to adopt harmonized financial 
standards); Arie C. Eernisse, Note, Banking on Cooperation: The Role of the G-20 in 
Improving the International Financial Architecture, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 239, 
254–56 (2012) (discussing the Basel III capital and liquidity framework and its 
emphasis on consistent global standards). 
 34. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 487, 
517 (2012). 
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problem is not unlike the tragedy of the anticommons in property law; 
where too many owners have rights to exclude others from a scarce 
resource, no individual owner has an effective privilege of use and the 
resource becomes prone to underuse.35 In a financial market context, 
where too many owners (e.g., investors) have rights in a scarce 
resource (a class of securities), no single investor will have a sufficient 
amount at risk to individually motivate monitoring. Undermonitoring 
caused by this incentive failure appears to have contributed, at least in 
part, to the 2008 financial crisis.36  
The problem of incentive failure is difficult to solve. Although 
regulation could require—perhaps for certain large issuances of 
complex securities—that a minimum unhedged position be held by a 
single sophisticated investor in each class of securities,37 regulatory 
attempts to limit risk dispersion would have tradeoffs: increasing the 
potential for regulatory arbitrage, impairing the ability of parties to 
achieve negotiated market efficiencies, and possibly even increasing 
financial instability.38  
 
 35. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998). The tragedy of 
the anticommons is not a perfect analogy because it occurs when too many owners have 
the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, whereas marginalization of risk (and 
its resulting undermonitoring) does not necessarily involve excluding others. Perhaps a 
more apt analogy for undermonitoring caused by marginalization of risk is the 
collective action problem of “rational apathy.” See, e.g., Julian Velasco, Taking 
Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 622–25 (2007) (discussing 
that problem). 
 36. Cf. Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Central Bank, Speech at the 
Fifth ECB Central Banking Conference: Undervalued Risk and Uncertainty: Some 
Thoughts on the Market Turmoil (Nov. 13, 2008), available at http://www.ecb.int/ 
press/key/date/2008/html/sp081113_1.en.html (“The root cause of the [financial] crisis 
was the overall and massive undervaluation of risk across markets, financial institutions 
and countries.”); Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, § MM 
(Magazine), at 24.  
 37. For a discussion of this type of regulation, see Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 
27–28. Securitization sellers are required by the Dodd-Frank Act to keep “skin in the 
game” by retaining risk in the form of at least a five percent unhedged vertical slice of 
risk. Problematically, such retention would only mitigate conflicts between the parties 
retaining and those taking on the risk, not between financial market participants and the 
non-financial market participants who bear the burden of externalized risk in a systemic 
collapse of the financial system. Id. at 28 n.136; cf. Kevin Villani, Risk-Retention 
Rules Set Up the Private Investor for Failure, AM. BANKER (Aug. 29, 2011, 3:06 PM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/QRM-qualifying-residential-mortgage-risk-
retention-housing-private-investor-1041645-1.html (arguing that lack of “skin in the 
game” was not responsible for financial firms’ “astronomical leverage”).  
 38. Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 35. Risk dispersion can create benefits such 
as reducing the asymmetry in market information and more efficiently allocating risks. 
This is accomplished by shifting risk on financial assets to investors and other market 
participants who are better able to assess risk. Risk dispersion can, however, also 
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E. Summary 
The first goal of any regulatory framework for managing systemic 
risk is maximizing economic efficiency within the financial system, and 
there are at least four types of market failures that impair efficiency. 
Information failure is primarily caused by complexity, for which there 
are no perfect solutions. Rationality failure is difficult, if not virtually 
impossible, to correct because human nature cannot be easily changed. 
Principal-agent failure can theoretically be addressed by paying 
managers—including secondary managers—under longer-term 
compensation schemes; but in practice that solution must overcome 
collective action problems, both within and across national borders. 
And the problem of incentive failure has only second-best solutions. 
Regulation therefore cannot completely prevent market failures within 
the financial system.39  
Next consider the second goal of any regulatory framework for 
managing systemic risk—protecting the financial system itself. In that 
context, I will show, among other things, that uncorrected market 
failures not only can impair efficiency within the financial system but 
also can contribute to a breakdown of the financial system. 
II. PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ITSELF 
There are at least three ways that regulation could protect the 
financial system itself. First, regulation could attempt to limit the 
triggers of systemic risk. Second, regulation could attempt to limit the 
transmission of systemic shocks. Third, regulation could attempt to 
stabilize the financial system when afflicted by systemic shocks.  
 
create market failures that cause market participants to misjudge or ignore potential 
correlations. A prime example is investors’ mistaken belief that asset-backed securities 
provided an investment market that was uncorrelated with traditional debt markets. To 
investors’ surprise, when ABS investments backed by subprime mortgage loans began 
defaulting, so did other ABS investments backed by other types of assets. Id. at 7–11, 
35. 
 39. In other contexts, I have summarized these market failures more 
intuitively as the “3Cs” of complexity, conflicts, and complacency—complexity 
corresponding to information failure and incentive failure; conflicts corresponding to 
principal-agent failure; and complacency corresponding to rationality failure. Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, Keynote Address at the South 
Carolina Law Review Symposium: 1.9 Kids and a Foreclosure: Subprime Mortgages, 
the Credit Crisis, and Restoring the American Dream (Oct. 24, 2008), in 60 S.C. L. 
REV. 549, 561–64 (2009) (suggesting the 3Cs categorization). Combined with the 
tragedy of the commons, these failures collectively can be referred to as the 3Cs and 
the TOC. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 204, 206. 
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A. Limiting the Triggers of Systemic Risk 
Ideal regulation would act ex ante, eliminating the triggers of 
systemic risk.40 Realistically, however, we cannot eliminate those 
triggers. As mentioned, although panics are often the triggers that 
commence a chain of systemic failures, it is impossible even to identify 
all the causes of panics.  
To some extent also, the market failures discussed41 could trigger 
panics or other systemic shocks. For example, information failure, 
principal-agent failure, and incentive failure could, individually or in 
combination, cause one or more large firms to overinvest, leading to 
bankruptcy; and rationality failure could cause prices of securities in a 
large financial market to collapse. As shown, these market failures 
cannot be completely corrected. 
Furthermore, market realities can increase the magnitude of these 
shocks. For example, credit markets often provide short-term funding 
of long-term capital needs because the interest rate on short-term debt is 
usually lower than that on long-term debt.42 This can create the 
financial market equivalent of bank runs if, due to investor anxiety, 
firms are unable to roll over, or refinance, their short-term debt.43 
 
 40. Steven L. Schwarcz, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches to Financial 
Regulation, Keynote Address at the 2011 Chapman Law Review Symposium “From 
Wall Street to Main Street: The Future of Financial Regulation” (Jan. 28, 2011), in 15 
CHAP. L. REV. 257, 258 (2011) (“Once a failure occurs, there may already be 
economic damage, and it may be difficult to stop the failure from spreading and 
becoming systemic.”). 
 41. See supra Part I. 
 42. Short-term debt is less risky—and therefore bears a lower interest rate—
than long-term debt, other things being equal, because it is easier to assess an obligor’s 
ability to repay in the short term than in the long term. 
 43. Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick argue, for example, that the precipitous 
2008 decline in value of mortgage-backed securities used as collateral for short-term 
repo loans prompted repo lenders to demand additional collateral. Gary Gorton & 
Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System 15–16 (Oct. 18, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676947. They 
contend that these demands approximated bank runs—in which panicked depositors 
withdraw funds from their banks—to the extent bank repo-borrowers were forced to sell 
assets to generate the additional collateral. Id. at 15. They also argue that these 
demands were caused primarily by opacity about the exposure of different borrowers to 
the flagging real estate market and the value of borrowers’ collateral in the event of 
defaults. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 
J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 23) (on file with the Wisconsin Law 
Review). Insofar as that opacity resulted from complexity, Gordon and Metrick’s 
argument supports my observation that complexity, one of the four market failures 
discussed, can trigger panics or other systemic shocks. 
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It is inevitable, therefore, that the financial system will face 
systemic shocks from time to time. Consider next how to limit the 
transmission of these shocks. 
B. Limiting the Transmission of Systemic Shocks 
Second-best regulation could act ex post, after a systemic shock is 
triggered, by limiting the transmission of the shock (i.e., limiting its 
contagion). This approach takes inspiration from chaos theory, which 
holds that in complex engineering systems—and, I have argued, also in 
complex financial systems—failures are almost inevitable.44 Therefore 
remedies should focus on breaking the transmission of these failures.45 
To break the transmission of systemic failures would require that 
the transmission mechanisms all be identifiable. It probably is not 
feasible, though, to identify all those mechanisms in advance. 
Nonetheless, based on a study of four financial crises in the past 
century, Professor Iman Anabtawi of UCLA and I have attempted to 
describe at least one such transmission mechanism.46  
We argue that “two otherwise independent correlations can 
combine to transmit localized economic shocks into broader systemic 
crises. The first is an intra-firm correlation between a firm’s financial 
integrity and its exposure to risk from low-probability adverse events 
that either constitute or could lead to economic shocks.”47 The second is 
a system-wide correlation among financial firms and markets.  
The 2008 financial crisis, for example, almost certainly was 
caused, or at least made worse, by the two correlations working in 
combination. Subprime mortgage loans were bundled together as 
collateral to partially support the payment of complex mortgage-backed 
securities that were sold to banks and other financial firms worldwide.48 
 
 44. Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 248–49. One aspect of chaos theory is 
deterministic chaos in dynamic systems, which recognizes that the more complex the 
system, the more likely it is that failures will occur. Thus, the most successful 
(complex) systems are those in which the consequences of failures are limited. In 
engineering design, for example, this can be done by decoupling systems through 
modularity that helps to reduce a chance that a failure in one part of the system will 
systemically trigger a failure in another part. Id. at 248. 
 45. Id. at 248–49. 
 46. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 19. 
 47. Id. at 1351 (footnote omitted). 
 48. To some extent, the U.S. government itself pressured banks and other 
mortgage lenders to make and securitize subprime mortgage loans, in order to expand 
homeownership. See, e.g., PETER J. WALLISON, THE LOST CAUSE: THE FAILURE OF THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION (2011), available at http://www.aei.org/files/ 
2011/02/10/FSO-2011-02-g.pdf. Misguided government policy can certainly contribute 
to systemic risk. See, e.g., E-mail from Charles Calomiris, Henry Kaufman Professor 
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When home prices began falling, some of these mortgage-backed 
securities began defaulting, requiring financial firms heavily invested in 
these securities to write down their value, causing these firms to 
appear, if not be, more financially risky.49 This represented a failure of 
these firms to see, or at least to fully appreciate, the intra-firm 
correlation between low-probability risk—in this case, the risk that 
home prices would significantly fall—and firm integrity.50 
The 2008 financial crisis also involved a failure to see system-wide 
correlations—not only the tight interconnectedness among banks and 
non-bank financial firms but also the tight interconnectedness between 
financial firms and markets.51 What made the financial crisis so 
devastating was that these failures combined to facilitate the 
transmission of economic shocks. 
Regulation should try to increase awareness of these types of 
correlations and limit their potential to combine. Professor Anabtawi 
and I have shown, however, that the same types of market failures that 
impair efficiency—which, this Essay has just demonstrated, cannot be 
completely prevented by regulation52—make it unlikely that financial 
market participants will use sufficient effort to either identify the 
correlations or attempt to prevent their combining.53 Furthermore, we 
 
of Fin. Insts., Columbia Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., to the author (Oct. 13, 2011) (on 
file with the author) (“Government policy is the main contributor to systemic risk, not 
just in the recent crisis, but more generally . . . .”).  
 49. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 50. The problem of assessing the risk of low-probability adverse events is 
especially acute during periods in which there have been no major adverse economic 
shocks. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 1367.  
[R]ecent stability will allay fears of adverse occurrences. Market 
participants may begin to view the data as following a normal distribution, 
in which observations that deviate dramatically from the mean lie in the 
distribution’s thin tails. In reality, however, the data may come from a 
distribution of outcomes with higher kurtosis, or “fat tails,” so that the true 
risk of extreme events is far greater than it is under a normal distribution.  
Alternatively, decisionmakers may underestimate low-probability events 
because of their mundaneness. Unusual events, such as a large meteor 
hitting the earth, are highly salient. In contrast, mundane events, such as 
changes in collateral value, are commonplace, possibly existing on a 
continuum. The familiarity with collateral of individuals working in the 
financial sector might have led them to underestimate the potential 
consequences of a drop in collateral prices.  
Id. at 1367–68 (footnotes omitted). 
 51. The tight interconnectedness described above also can have a temporal 
component insofar as the connections, being interactive, work too quickly to control. 
See supra note 9. 
 52. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 53. Information and incentive failure, for example, can cause failures to 
identify or fully appreciate both correlations: between low-probability risk and firm 
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have identified only one of potentially many transmission mechanisms 
for systemic failure.54 We therefore need to turn to ways to stabilize the 
financial system that go beyond limiting the transmission of systemic 
shocks.  
C. Stabilizing the Afflicted Financial System 
Regulation could also work ex post even after a systemic shock has 
been triggered and is being transmitted. The regulation would then 
attempt to stabilize the afflicted financial system. This could be done by 
trying to stabilize systemically important firms and financial markets 
impacted by the transmission.55 This approach again takes inspiration 
from chaos theory, insofar as that theory holds that remedies should 
also focus on limiting the consequences of failures.56 
There are at least two ways that regulation could stabilize 
systemically important firms and financial markets: by ensuring 
liquidity to those firms and markets, and by requiring those firms and 
markets to be more internally robust.  
1. ENSURING LIQUIDITY TO FIRMS AND MARKETS  
Liquidity has traditionally been used, especially by government 
central banks, to help prevent financial firms from defaulting. The U.S. 
Federal Reserve Bank, for example, has had this role of lender of last 
resort to banks,57 and the European Commission is in the process of 
attempting to help recapitalize European banks that are exposed to 
sovereign-debt risk.  
Ensuring liquidity to stabilize systemically important firms would 
follow this pattern, except that the source of the liquidity could at least 
be partly privatized by taxing those firms to create a systemic risk 
 
integrity, and among financial firms and markets. Rationality failure can also foster 
failures to identify or fully appreciate the first correlation: between low-probability risk 
and firm integrity. And principal-agent failure can result in a failure to identify or fully 
appreciate the first correlation: between low-probability risk and firm integrity. See 
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 1363–70. 
 54. Cf. supra note 48 (noting that misguided government policy can contribute 
to systemic risk). Being driven by short-term political decisions and other non-
economic factors, government policy will always be a risk factor.  
 55. To the extent regulation stabilizes a systemically important firm that 
otherwise would be failing due to endogenous or non-systemic exogenous causes, the 
regulation could also be viewed as an ex ante solution. 
 56. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 57. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6 § 13(3), 38 Stat. 263, 263–64 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006)). 
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fund.58 There is strong precedent for requiring the private sector to 
contribute to funds that would help to internalize externalities. The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, for example, requires member 
banks to contribute to a Deposit Insurance Fund to ensure that 
depositors of failed banks are repaid.59 In the nuclear industry, the 
Price-Anderson Act requires a first-tier funding of $375 million by each 
owner of a nuclear reactor to compensate for possible reactor accidents. 
The Act also requires an $11.6 billion self-insurance fund, funded 
collectively by all owners of nuclear reactors.60 
In the systemic risk context, privatizing the source of liquidity 
would likewise help to internalize externalities by addressing the 
dilemma that market participants are economically motivated to create 
externalities that could have systemic consequences.61 Privatization 
would not only offset the cost to taxpayers of liquidity advances that are 
not repaid but also, if structured appropriately,62 should discourage 
fund contributors—including those that believe they are “too big to 
fail”—from engaging in financially risky activities.  
 
 58. Although it is possible that the financial industry itself might voluntarily 
create and contribute to such a fund, I believe that is highly unlikely. Because systemic 
financial externalities are imposed on parties outside the financial industry, the 
industry, qua industry, would not necessarily have an incentive to do that. See supra 
notes 21-22 and accompanying text. Moreover, even if there were incentive, the 
financial industry may be too fragmented and heterogeneous to efficiently self-
coordinate. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward 
Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 420 (2011) (observing 
“regulatory fragmentation and heterogeneity of interests throughout the [financial] 
industry” as well as “the lack of a ‘community of fate’ mentality”). 
 59. See infra note 62.  
 60. Fact Sheet on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief Funds, U.S.NRC, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.html (last updated 
June 9, 2011). 
 61. Cf. supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.  
 62. For example, required contributions could be sized as a function, among 
other factors, of the contributor’s financially risky activities. This Essay does not, 
however, purport to set formulas for required contributions, other than observing that 
there is precedent for sizing required private sector contributions on risk. The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, for example, assesses risk-based premiums on its 
member banks. Capital Groups and Supervisory Groups, FDIC, http:// 
www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/risk/rrps_ovr.html (last updated July 13, 2007) 
(stating that member banks are assessed based on the risk they pose to the Deposit 
Insurance Fund). Assessment rates for member banks in 2011 ranged from 2.5 cents to 
45 cents on every $100 of assessable deposits. Deposit Insurance Assessments, FDIC, 
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/assessments/proposed.html (last updated May 
24, 2011). For more information on FDIC assessments, see 12 C.F.R. pt. 327 (2011), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/2000-
5000.html#fdic2000part327.10.  
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Perversely, the Dodd-Frank Act undercuts liquidity by sharply 
limiting the power of the Federal Reserve to make emergency loans to 
individual or insolvent financial firms.63 That categorical limitation 
appears somewhat excessive, if not dangerous; a lender of last resort 
can be an important safeguard if it acts judiciously. Even more 
perversely, the idea of a systemic risk fund was originally included in 
the bill that would become the Dodd-Frank Act but was taken out 
before enactment because of opposition by politicians who believed that 
the fund would increase moral hazard by institutionalizing bailouts.64 I 
believe that belief is misguided. The likelihood that systemically 
important firms will have to make additional contributions to the fund 
to replenish bailout monies should motivate those firms to monitor each 
other and help control each other’s risky behavior.65 Because their own 
funds would be at risk, for example, fund contributors would have 
incentives to inform regulators when other firms take unwise risks.66 If 
the required contributions to the fund are risk-adjusted, fund 
contributors would also have incentives to report firms that are 
underpaying.67 
The European Commission apparently has been considering the 
idea of a systemic risk fund in connection with its proposal to tax the 
financial sector.68 Although the ultimate use of the tax revenues is 
currently unresolved,69 news reports indicate that an originally 
 
 63. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 1101, 124 Stat. 1376, 2113–15 (2010). 
 64. See S. Amendment 3827, 111th Cong. (2010), 156 CONG. REC. S3223 
(daily ed. May 5, 2010) (eliminating the proposed $50 billion dollar fund, financed by a 
tax on banks, that would help wind down failed financial companies); Edward Wyatt & 
David M Herzenhorn, Bill Drops Fund to Shut Failed Banks, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 
2010, at B1. 
 65. Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 27–28. 
 66. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: 
Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 
YALE J. ON REG. 151, 156 (2011) (calling for a systemic emergency insurance fund that 
is funded by the financial industry). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Taxation of the Financial Sector, COM (2010) 549 final (Oct. 7, 2010), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/ 
com_2010_0549_en.pdf; see also Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common 
System of Financial Tax and Amending Directive 2008/7/EC COM (2011) 594 final 
(Sept. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Council Directive], available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/com(2011)
594_en.pdf. 
 69. Council Directive, supra note 68, at 3 (indicating that one of the possible 
uses of the tax would be to provide a source of funds for the EU).  
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contemplated use was a systemic risk fund.70 The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) also appears to be using the European 
Commission tax proposal as a platform to announce that “new taxes on 
banks [are] needed to provide an insurance fund for future financial 
meltdowns and to curb excessive risktaking.”71 Ideally, any tax on the 
financial sector should be global to avoid prejudicing the 
competitiveness of firms located in particular taxing jurisdictions.72  
Besides stabilizing systemically important firms, it is important to 
remember that financial markets, too, can be triggers and transmitters 
of systemic risk. Liquidity can also be used to stabilize systemically 
important financial markets.73 For example, in response to the post-
Lehman collapse of the commercial paper market, the Federal Reserve 
created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to act as a 
lender of last resort for that market, with the goal of addressing 
“temporary liquidity distortions” by purchasing commercial paper from 
highly rated issuers that could not otherwise sell their paper.74 The 
CPFF apparently helped to stabilize the commercial paper market.75 
This is different from quantitative easing, in which a central bank 
purchases securities as a form of monetary policy.76 The task of a 
 
 70. Commission Proposes a Bank Tax to Cover the Costs of Winding Down 
Banks that Go Bust, EUR. COMMISSION (May 26, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/news/ 
economy/100526_en.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 71. Larry Elliott Washington & Jill Treanor, IMF: Supervise and Tax Banks 
or Risk Crisis, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 8, 2010, at 25 (paraphrasing an 
announcement by the IMF’s then-managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn). 
Previously, the G-20 leaders had requested that the IMF prepare a report, detailing 
“how the financial sector could make a fair and substantial contribution toward paying 
for any burden associated with government interventions to repair the banking system.” 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, A FAIR AND SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION BY THE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR: FINAL REPORT FOR THE G-20, at 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf. 
 72. The European Commission has recognized this in connection with its 
proposal to impose a tax on the financial sector. Cf. Memorandum from Cadwalader, 
Wickersham & Taft LLP on Proposals for a European Union Financial Transactions 
Tax 10 (Oct. 26, 2011), available at http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client_friend/ 
102511_-_EU_FTT.pdf (noting that unless all key financial jurisdictions are included in 
a financial transaction tax, investors will be tempted to relocate their financial 
transactions away from the EU). 
 73. This was first proposed in Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 225–30. 
 74. See TOBIAS ADRIAN, KARIN KIMBROUGH & DINA MARCHIONI, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO. 423, THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S COMMERCIAL 
PAPER FUNDING FACILITY (2010), available at http:www.newyorkfed.org/research/ 
staff_reports/sr423.pdf. 
 75. Id. at 27 (“The CPFF indeed had a stabilizing effect on the commercial 
paper market . . . .”).  
 76. The U.S. Federal Reserve, for example, has been engaging in quantitative 
easing programs, purchasing U.S. Treasury securities in order to hold down long-term 
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market liquidity provider of last resort would be more targeted: to 
stabilize panicked financial markets that are systematically important, 
thereby mitigating the systemic impact of a market collapse.77 
To illustrate how this approach can be applied more broadly, 
consider the following example. The intrinsic value—effectively the 
present value of the expected value of the underlying cash flows—of a 
type of mortgage-backed security is estimated to be in the range of 
eighty cents on the dollar. If, due to panic, the market price of those 
securities had fallen significantly below that number, say, to twenty 
cents on the dollar, the market liquidity provider could purchase these 
securities at, say, sixty cents on the dollar, thereby stabilizing the 
market and still making a profit. To induce a holder of the mortgage-
backed securities to sell at that price, the market liquidity provider 
could, for example, agree to pay a higher “deferred purchase price” if 
the securities turn out to be worth more than expected.78 This is just one 
(simplified) example of the flexible pricing approaches used in 
structured financing transactions to buy financial assets of uncertain 
value which could be adapted to a market liquidity provider’s 
purchases.79  
 
interest rates. See Annalyn Censky, QE2: Fed Pulls the Trigger, CNNMONEY (Nov. 3, 
2010, 4:21 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/11/03/news/economy/fed_decision/ 
index.htm. 
 77. One might ask why, if a market liquidity provider of last resort can invest 
at a deep discount to stabilize markets and still make money, private investors would 
not also do so, thereby eliminating the need for some sort of governmental market 
liquidity provider. One answer is that individuals at investing firms will not want to 
jeopardize their reputations (and jobs) by causing their firms to invest at a time when 
other investors have abandoned the market. Another answer is that private investors 
usually want to buy and sell securities, without having to wait for their maturities, 
whereas a market liquidity provider of last resort should be able to wait until maturity, 
if necessary. 
 78. Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big To Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety 
Net, in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 
94, 99 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010) (using this 
example). 
 79. “Alternatively, a market liquidity provider [of last resort] could attempt to 
stabilize the market by entering into derivatives contracts to strip out risks that the 
market has the greatest difficulty hedging—in effect, the market’s irrationality 
element—thereby stimulating private investment. By hedging—and not actually 
purchasing securities directly—the market liquidity provider would appear to be taking 
less investment risk, and thus its function may be seen as more politically acceptable.” 
Id. 
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2. REQUIRING FIRMS AND MARKETS TO BE MORE INTERNALLY ROBUST  
Regulation could also help to stabilize systemically important firms 
and markets by requiring them to be more internally robust.80 This 
could be accomplished in various ways. First consider firms. 
The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, requires banks and, to the 
extent designated as “systemically important,” other financial firms to 
be subject to a range of capital and similar requirements.81 Addressing 
the possibility that a firm could nevertheless end up failing, the Act also 
requires these firms to submit a resolution plan—a so-called “living 
will”—that sets forth how the firm would liquidate in an orderly 
manner to minimize further systemic impact.82  
The extent to which these types of approaches will work, and their 
potential impact on efficiency, are open questions. Reducing a firm’s 
leverage, for example, can certainly enable the firm to withstand 
economic shocks and reduce its chance of failure.83 The Basel capital 
requirements, however, did not prevent the many bank failures 
resulting from the 2008 financial crisis. Setting regulatory limits on 
leverage could also backfire, because some leverage is good but there is 
no optimal across-the-board amount of leverage that is right for every 
firm.84 Regulation should at least focus, however, on attempting to 
 
 80. Although I refer to regulation requiring firms to become more internally 
robust as ex post (in the sense that more robust firms can better withstand a systemic 
shock), such regulation could also be viewed as ex ante in the sense that robust firms 
are less likely to fail and thereby trigger a systemic shock. I am still pondering the 
appropriate ex-ante/ex-post distinction.  
 81. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§ 115(b), 165(i), 124 Stat. 1376, 1403–04, 1430 (2010). The Dodd-
Frank Act directs the Federal Reserve, for example, to set “prudential” capital 
standards for certain large financial firms, including a maximum debt-to-equity ratio of 
15:1. § 165(j). 
 82. § 165(d). 
 83. Cf. supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing highly leveraged firms 
engaging in fire-sales of assets). 
 84. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 224. The Basel Committee has introduced a 
binding three percent leverage ratio that will take effect in 2018 and will require banks 
to hold three percent of Tier 1 capital, which is primarily comprised of common equity. 
The leverage ratio will prevent banks from accumulating assets worth more than thirty-
three times their Tier 1 capital. Members of the Basel Committee have argued that a 
binding leverage ratio is critical since “risk-based ratios alone are vulnerable to 
gaming.” Hervé Hannoun, Deputy Gen. Manager, Bank for Int’l Settlements, 
Introductory Remarks at the International Association of Deposit Insurers 2011 
Research Conference: Financial Crises: The Role of Deposit Insurance 3 (June 8, 
2011), available at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110609.pdf (highlighting the 
importance of the Basel III commitment to move toward a binding leverage ratio). Of 
course, national regulators will have to implement such international requirements on a 
domestic level before they take effect, and the idea has prompted considerable criticism 
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prevent firms from opportunistically overleveraging themselves during 
boom times, thereby correcting that type of cyclical imbalance.85  
One also might question Dodd-Frank’s living-will requirement. Ex 
ante plans (such as a liquidation plan made when a financial firm is 
healthy) rarely match ex post realities (such as the realities facing the 
firm when financially challenged). Moreover, it is uncertain whether 
future politicians would, or should, force the liquidation of a large 
financial firm, even pursuant to its living will, without considering the 
consequences at that time.  
The Dodd-Frank Act also includes procedures for limiting a 
systemically important firm’s right to make risky investments—often 
referred to as the Volcker Rule.86 This is a highly paternalistic 
approach, substituting a blanket regulatory prescription for a firm’s 
own business judgment.87 One should be generally skeptical of any rule 
that attempts to protect a sophisticated financial firm from itself 88—and 
 
from European leaders. Jim Brunsden, Banks in Europe May Win EU Exemption from 
Basel Leverage Ratio, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2010, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-17/banks-in-europe-said-to-be-poised-to-
escape-basel-rules-that-curtail-debt.html (stating that a majority of EU members oppose 
the new Basel leverage ratio and may seek an exemption from it); Jim Brunsden & 
Meera Louis, Germany, France Said to Fight Basel Bank-Leverage Disclosure, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2011-03-11/germany-france-said-to-fight-basel-rules-forcing-banks-to-reveal-
leverage.html (noting that France and Germany are “fiercely against” Basel proposals 
for lenders to reveal as soon as 2015 whether they would meet the leverage ratio). 
 85. The Basel Committee has attempted to address overleveraging in part by 
introducing a counter-cyclical capital requirement of up to 2.5% of common equity or 
other loss-absorbing capital (above the new Basel III regulatory minimum) that national 
regulators can impose when they suspect the emergence of credit bubbles. The buffer 
can be drawn down in periods of financial stress. Press Release, Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announces Higher Global 
Minimum Capital Standards 2 (Sept. 12, 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/press/ 
p100912.pdf. 
 86. See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13 (codifying steps to implement the 
Volcker Rule limiting proprietary trading). Several federal agencies—the Federal 
Reserve Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency—recently proposed rules to implement this. Prohibitions 
and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships 
with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 (proposed Nov. 7, 
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 248, 351; 17 C.F.R. pt. 255), available at 
http://fdic.gov/news/board/2011Octno6.pdf. 
 87. The Volcker Rule might be considered, conceptually, as a subset of ring-
fencing. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. Ring-fencing, however, could 
impose regulation that goes beyond investment limitations, potentially restricting other 
business decisions of banks and systemically important firms.  
 88. I recognize that even sophisticated financial firms sometimes might not 
fully understand a highly complex investment. Cf. supra note 21 and accompanying text 
(discussing misinformation). The ultimate question of the value of the Volcker Rule will 
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indeed, Moody’s has warned that a leaked early draft of interagency 
rules implementing the Volcker Rule would, if adopted, probably 
“‘diminish the flexibility and profitability of banks’ valuable market-
making operations and place them at a competitive disadvantage to 
firms not constrained by the rule.’”89  
Dodd-Frank appropriately does require many large public firms to 
institute internal governance procedures to protect the firm, including 
establishing risk committees (with at least one risk-management expert) 
responsible for enterprise-wide risk-management oversight.90 Well 
managed firms should—and in my experience already do—have these 
types of procedures and committees. 
Also appropriately, the Dodd-Frank Act does not attempt to 
artificially limit the size of financial firms. Some have argued that size 
limits would minimize the potential moral hazard from firms that 
believe they are “too big to fail.” There is, however, no clear evidence 
of such risky behavior, and financial firm losses can be explained by 
other reasons. Size should be governed by the economies of scale and 
scope needed for firms to successfully compete, domestically and 
abroad—so long as that size is manageable.  
We should be cautious, however, of financial firms that increase 
their size, especially by acquisition of other firms, primarily to satisfy 
senior management egos.91 Dodd-Frank indirectly addresses this 
concern (at least weakly) by linking senior executive compensation to 
long-term results—for example, requiring stock exchanges to adopt 
standards whereby listed companies implement policies to recoup senior 
executive compensation in the event of an accounting restatement.92  
Another way that regulation could make systemically important 
firms more internally robust is by requiring at least some portion of 
their debt to be in the form of so-called contingent capital.93 Contingent 
 
therefore be empirical: whether the benefits of its limitation on proprietary trading will 
outweigh profits lost by losing the ability to engage in such trading. Although some 
may argue that those benefits, which accrue to all, should be more highly weighted than 
profits, which accrue only to the financial firms themselves, my proposal for a 
privatized systemic risk fund should help to internalize any harm of proprietary trading. 
See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.  
 89. Edward Wyatt, Regulators to Set Forth Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
11, 2011, at B1 (quoting Moody’s).  
 90. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(h). 
 91. I thank my colleague, Lawrence Baxter—a banking law professor, turned 
senior bank executive, and recently returned to the academy—for this observation.  
 92. Sec. 954, § 10D. 
 93. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk after Dodd-Frank: 
Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies beyond Oversight, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 795 (2011). Coffee’s proposal for “bail in” contingent capital 
conversion calls for conversion on a gradual, incremental basis. Debt would convert to 
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capital debt would automatically convert to equity upon the occurrence 
of pre-agreed events. Requiring contingent capital is therefore 
effectively like requiring a pre-planned debt restructuring or workout.  
It is unclear if regulatory-imposed contingent capital would be 
efficient.94 If contingent capital is a good idea, markets themselves 
should implement it; but there is no evidence of that implementation 
(nor is there evidence of market failures impeding that implementation). 
One should also be skeptical whether regulatory-imposed contingent 
capital might have unforeseen consequences. For example, automatic 
conversions of debt claims to equity interests might create counterparty 
risk by reducing the value of firms holding those claims.95 
Finally, regulation could focus on making systemically important 
firms more internally robust at least to the extent such firms provide 
public goods. In the United States, for example, the Glass-Steagall Act 
(which has since been revoked) had created a separation between 
commercial and investment banking—the former including deposit 
taking and lending, the latter including securities underwriting and 
investing. Although the Dodd-Frank Act does not reinstitute this 
separation, the final report of the U.K. Independent Commission on 
Banking (often called the Vickers Report)96 recommends a more limited 
form of separation, which it calls ring-fencing, intended to protect the 
“basic banking services of safeguarding retail deposits, operating secure 
payments systems, efficiently channelling savings to productive 
 
a senior, nonconvertible preferred stock with cumulative dividends and voting rights. 
This structure would allow for the dilution of equity to deter excessive risk taking, the 
creation of a class of risk-averse preferred shareholders to counteract the risk-favoring 
tendencies of common shareholders, and the avoidance of an “all-or-nothing” 
transition. Id. at 795–96. 
 94. As of July 2011, the Basel Committee has determined that systemically 
important financial firms will only be allowed to meet their additional loss absorbency 
requirement with common equity Tier 1 capital, not contingent capital. The Basel 
Committee will, however, “continue to review contingent capital, and support the use 
of contingent capital to meet higher national loss absorbency requirements than the 
global requirement, as high-trigger contingent capital could help absorb losses on a 
going concern basis.” BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY 
IMPORTANT BANKS: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE ADDITIONAL LOSS 
ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT 19–20 (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbs201.pdf.  
 95. The conversion would constitute an actual reduction in value if the pre-
agreed trigger is sensible.  
 96. Although I provided input for this report in a November 12, 2010 meeting 
at All Souls College, University of Oxford, with Commission Chairman Sir John 
Vickers and other members of the Commission’s Secretariat, I did not suggest the ring-
fencing procedure that the report eventually adopted.  
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investments [i.e., making loans], and managing financial risk.”97 The 
ring-fencing proposed in the Vickers Report appears to have similarities 
to ring-fencing used in the United States to protect essential public 
utilities, which often operate as subsidiaries within holding-company 
structures.98  
Ring-fencing is more of a micro- than macro-prudential approach 
since its focus is more on protecting retail banking activities rather than 
on preventing systemic collapse.99 Nonetheless, to the extent it 
improves consumer confidence, ring-fencing of retail banking might be 
beneficial to the real economy.100  
D. Summary 
Regulation could protect the financial system in at least three 
ways: by limiting the triggers of systemic risk, by limiting the 
 
 97. INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2011) 
[hereinafter VICKERS REPORT]. 
 98. In expert testimony to a state public service commission, I have recently 
defined utility ring-fencing as follows:  
The term ring-fencing is not always clearly defined. By “ring-fencing,” I 
mean protection of [the utility subsidiary] and its assets from harm caused 
by the [utility subsidiary’s] affiliates. A primary goal of ring-fencing is 
protecting the [utility subsidiary] from harm caused by a possible 
bankruptcy of one or more of its affiliates. This is achieved by making it 
unlikely that an affiliate’s bankruptcy will involuntarily force the [utility 
subsidiary] into bankruptcy or cause a substantive consolidation of the 
affiliate and the [utility subsidiary] or cause the [utility subsidiary] to 
voluntarily file for bankruptcy. Another goal of ring-fencing is protecting 
the [utility subsidiary’s] assets from being raided by an affiliate. This can be 
achieved by imposing dividend restrictions on the [utility subsidiary] and by 
restricting non-arm’s length transactions that are unfair to the [utility 
subsidiary].  
Rebuttal Testimony of Steven L. Schwarcz at 3–4, In re Matter of the Merger of 
Exelon Corp. & Constellation Energy Grp., Inc., (Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md. 2011) 
(No. 9271) (on file with the author). The Vickers Report similarly proposes that the 
“banks’ UK retail activities . . . be carried out in separate subsidiaries. The UK retail 
subsidiaries would be legally, economically and operationally separate from the rest of 
the banking groups to which they belonged.” VICKERS REPORT, supra note 97, at 11.  
 99. Cf. Laurence Kotlikoff, Why the Vickers Report Failed the UK and the 
World, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2011), http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2011/09/ 
why-the-vickers-report-failed-the-uk-and-the-world/ (observing, among other things, 
that the flaw of “ring-fencing good banks and letting bad banks do their thing” is 
demonstrated by “the collapse of Lehman Brothers [which Prof. Kotlikoff likens to a 
bad bank], whose failure nearly destroyed the global financial system”).  
 100. In addition to helping to stabilize firms, regulation could help to stabilize 
systemically important markets, such as by requiring appropriate circuit breakers. See, 
e.g., Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 1398–1401 (discussing market circuit 
breakers).  
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transmission of systemic shocks, and by attempting to stabilize the 
system. Eliminating the triggers of systemic risk is not feasible. 
Eliminating the transmission of systemic shocks is likewise not feasible.  
It therefore is critical to try to stabilize the financial system against 
the consequences of systemic shocks. This will involve stabilizing both 
systemically important financial firms and markets impacted by the 
shocks. This Essay has examined two approaches to stabilization: 
ensuring liquidity to those firms and markets, and requiring those firms 
and markets to be more internally robust.  
The first approach—ensuring liquidity—would help to stabilize 
firms and markets. It also would help to control the motivation of 
systemically important firms to externalize their costs. If the source of 
the liquidity could be privatized, public costs would be even further 
reduced. The extent to which regulation can efficiently require 
systemically important firms and markets to be more internally robust 
is, however, a more open question.  
CONCLUSION 
This Essay examines how the law can help to control financial 
chaos. To that end, regulation should strive not only to maximize 
economic efficiency within the financial system but also to protect the 
financial system itself. Any regulatory framework for achieving these 
goals, however, will be imperfect and have tradeoffs. 
Market failures that impair efficiency are not always susceptible to 
legal solutions. For example, increasing financial complexity has 
created information failures that even disclosure cannot remedy, 
whereas law-imposed standardization would have its own flaws. 
Bounded human rationality limits the effectiveness of even otherwise 
ideal laws. And the increasing dispersion of financial risk is 
undermining monitoring incentives. 
One type of market failure—principal-agent failure—is 
theoretically susceptible to legal solutions. To the extent financial firms 
do not change their compensation schemes, regulation could require 
them to pay managers, critically including secondary managers, under 
longer-term compensation arrangements. But because financial 
managers can work in money centers worldwide, this type of regulation 
ideally should be global to avoid prejudicing the competitiveness of 
firms subject to particular national rules.  
Regulation should also strive to protect the financial system itself. 
Because we do not yet know enough about how systemic risk is 
triggered and spread, this type of regulation should operate primarily to 
help reduce systemic consequences by stabilizing parts of the financial 
system afflicted by systemic shocks. That could be done in two ways: 
840 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
by ensuring liquidity to systemically important firms and markets, and 
by requiring those firms and markets to be more internally robust.  
The extent to which regulation could efficiently require 
systemically important firms and markets to be more internally robust is 
unclear. Ensuring liquidity to those firms and markets could increase 
stability, however, especially if the liquidity sources are required (at 
least partly) to be privatized. That not only would help to internalize 
externalities but also would motivate systemically important firms to 
monitor each other and help control each other’s risky behavior. Again, 
this type of regulation ideally should be global to avoid prejudicing the 
competitiveness of firms subject to particular national regulatory 
requirements.  
 
